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Abstract
We study an asymmetric information model in which two ﬁrms
are active on a market where buyers only observe the average quality
supplied. Quantities and cost structures are exogenously given and
ﬁrms compete in quality. Before choosing their qualities, they bargain
over a perfectly enforcable minimum quality standard. The bargaining
outcome is given by the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. Agreement
on a binding standard is possible only if the ﬁrms are suﬃciently sim-
ilar with respect to their production costs. The agreed-upon standard
always falls short of the joint-proﬁt-maximizing (or, for that matter,
the eﬃcient) level. It is decreasing in the high-cost producer’s cost
of production. Yet, it ﬁrst increases then decreases with the low-cost
producer’s cost of production, showing that the latter’s bargaining
position can be enhanced by seemingly adverse cost changes.
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11 Introduction
Since Akerlof (1970) put into light the negative consequences of asymmetric
information on market outcomes in his famous article on "lemons", a great
deal of attention has been devoted to the study of potential remedies. Among
those, the imposition of a minimal quality standard (MQS) has very often
looked like a minimally invasive yet promising form of government interven-
tion.
Leland (1979) oﬀered an elegant formalization of these ideas. Using a
continuum of price-taking producers, he showed that quality deterioration
indeed takes place on unregulated markets with asymmetric information and
that there are a number of instances where a MQS, although generally not
ﬁrst-best, increases social welfare. Leland also showed that, if the standard is
set by the producers so as to maximize their joint proﬁts, then it is in general
likely, and certain if a typical Spencian (1975) condition is satisﬁed, that the
standard will be "too high" (that is, higher than the welfare-maximizing
standard), as producers have the additional monopoly incentive to decrease
output so as to drive prices up.
Later on, the issue of the desirability of a MQS was preferrably addressed
within the frame of a full-information, vertically-diﬀerentiated duopoly à la
Mussa-Rosen (1978) where ﬁrms ﬁrst choose qualities and then compete for
customers. Ronnen (1991) proved that when ﬁrms compete in prices in the
second stage and quality aﬀects ﬁxed costs, the introduction of a MQS leads
to a narrowing of the quality gap that, because it increases price competition,
increases welfare through higher average quality, consumer participation and
consumer surplus. This contribution spurred a lot of eﬀort aimed at checking
whether this favorable eﬀect of introducing a MQS was robust to the assumed
cost structure (Crampes and Hollander [1995]), the possibility of collusion
(Ecchia and Lambertini [1997]), the duopoly setting (Scarpa [1998]) or the
nature of competition (Valletti [2000]). At a general level, it is possible to
say that there exist some instances in which the rise in consumer surplus
following the introduction of a MQS is large enough to compensate for the
decrease in ﬁrm’s proﬁts so that total welfare goes up. Nonetheless, in many
of these instances, one has to trade the welfare of some consumers (typically,
the high-quality buyers) for the welfare of some others (typically, the low-
quality buyers).
In our opinion, what has been lost in this last strand of literature was
Leland’s original consideration of a biased standard-setting process. Noth-
2ing indeed guarantees that a benevolent decision-maker will strive to achieve
eﬃciency. Very often, the government, or the standard-setting organiza-
tion, is not independent of producers, or insensitive to their interests. As a
matter of fact, as in the case of technological standards, producers can some-
times choose which authority will certify their compliance with a norm and
may therefore engage into "strategic forum shopping" (see Lerner and Tirole
[2004]). In addition, there exist many professions whose regulation in gen-
eral, and quality regulation in particular, is left to "representative bodies".
Medicine is a good example of such an auto-regulated industry and there is a
long history of suspicion toward the way licensing and other quality require-
ments are used by medical organizations (for an early and strong statement
in the US context, see Kessel [1958]).
The key to Leland’s result about the "overprovision of quality" when a
MQS is set by the industry is that side-payments can be made among produc-
ers. Indeed, in his model, producers succeed in rising quality by eliminating
the lowest qualities’ suppliers. If proﬁts are transferable, it is possible to
compensate the producers evicted from the market. Thus, in the event these
producers have a say in the standard-setting process, it is always possible
to buy their approval. There are a number of instances, though, where it
does not seem appropriate to assume that the required side-payments are
possible. Often, especially in oligopolistic markets, antitrust considerations
lead to the prohibition of direct payments between ﬁrms and to restrictions
to the use of hidden-payment vehicles such as joint R&D or marketing ef-
forts. Even the clearest cases of collusion rarely involve direct proﬁt sharing
but rather agreements on a scheme to ﬁx prices, allot market shares or co-
ordinate auction bids. Hence, we believe that there is some justiﬁcation for
studying the outcome of a process in which the incumbent suppliers bargain
over the choice of a MQS as a result of their inability perfectly to redistribute
the cartel proﬁts. This question is not usefully addressed within the frame-
work of the full-information models mentioned above. Indeed, as Crampes
and Hollander (1995) have proved, in these models the high-quality ﬁrm al-
ways loses, and the low-quality ﬁrm always beneﬁts, from the imposition of
a mildly restrictive MQS. (Exit occurs if the standard is severely restrictive.)
Hence, the interests of the ﬁrms radically diverge when it comes to adopting
a common norm and no common ground can be found. This degeneracy of
the bargaining problem does not arise when ﬁrms have a common interest
in sustaining quality. This element is present under imperfect information
whenever consumers care about some measure of the average level of quality
3in the market.
As a ﬁrst attempt at tackling this research program, we construct a simple
Akerlovian model of MQS bargaining between two ﬁrms. Consumers cannot
observe or infer the quality of the goods or services produced by a given ﬁrm.
Instead, demand depends upon the average quality of goods available in the
market. Firms are free to choose the quality of their product as long as
they do not violate the MQS they might have agreed upon in the ﬁrst place.
They diﬀer in their marginal cost of production given quality. Once qualities
have been chosen, the goods are brought to the market, the price set so as
to equate supply with demand, and the proﬁts realized. Given these proﬁt
opportunities, the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solution is assumed
to capture the outcome of the standard-setting negotiation between the two
ﬁrms taking place ahead of production.1
The unregulated market is characterized by underprovision of quality
and free riding on the part of the high-cost producer. We show that the
bargaining problem is non-degenerate only if the ﬁrms are not too dissimilar
with respect to the cost of quality. Under large cost heterogeneity, the high-
cost ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to agree to any quality norm. This is
b e c a u s ei tc a n n o tp r o ﬁt from a standard that does not force the low-cost ﬁrm
into raising quality as well. If there is a big diﬀerence in costs, it simply does
not pay for the high-cost producer to undertake the "jump" in quality needed
for this to happen. By contrast, if the ﬁrms’ costs are not too dissimilar, then
there exists a range of mutually proﬁtable standards. Through bargaining,
the ﬁrms settle for a standard that is too low, when compared to the proﬁt-
maximizing, or for that matter the (second-most) eﬃcient, level.
At a conceptual level, these results can be attributed to the non-transferable
nature of proﬁt in our model. Joint-proﬁt maximization would require ﬁrms
to set the MQS at a level that considerably enhances the low-cost producer’s
proﬁtability relatively to the high-cost producer’s. This extremely unequal
allocation of proﬁts cannot arise through bargaining because there exist other
MQS levels that are more favorable to the high-cost producer and these are
the source of its bargaining power.
The agreed-upon MQS often exhibits the intuitive property that an in-
crease in one ﬁrm’s cost of quality leads to a decrease in the adopted quality
1For a characterization of the solution, see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). These
authors attributed the ﬁrst mention of this solution to Raiﬀa. Hence, it is sometimes
described as the "Raiﬀa solution".
4standard. Perhaps surprisingly, the converse is true when ﬁrms’ costs are
relatively dissimilar (yet similar enough for the bargaining problem not to be
degenerate). In that case, an increase in the eﬃcient producer’s cost of qual-
ity leads to an increase in the adopted standard. This is because, although
the high-cost producer’s best proﬁt opportunity from adopting a common
standard is little aﬀected by the increase in cost, the low-cost producer’s
maximal gain increases enormously, as the ineﬃcient producer is suddenly
in the position to agree to a much larger range of standards. Thus, the
reduced dissimilarity between the ﬁr m so p e n su pt h er a n g eo fm u t u a l l yb e n -
eﬁcial bargains in a way that is biased toward the low-cost producer. As the
KS bargaining solution is monotone in the bargainers’ maximal utility gains,
that translates into a shift of the solution towards the low-cost producer’s
interests, which can be achieved only through an increase in the adopted
standard.
One can question our choice of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tion. Numerous bargaining solutions have been proposed in the literature
over the years and they all come with diﬀerent characteristic properties or
non-cooperative foundations. The KS, along with the Nash and the egali-
tarian solutions, are the ones that stand most of the tests that one could
possibly devise (see the presentation by Thomson [1994]). One reason for
our choice of the KS solution is that in this model, it leads to a tractable
quadratic equation, whereas the Nash bargaining solution leads to an un-
appealing quartic equation. In addition, in the context of standard setting,
we ﬁnd the monotonicity property that diﬀerentiates the KS from the Nash
solution appealing. This property requires that an expansion of the feasible
set in a direction favorable to a particular agent always beneﬁts him. This
is clearly desirable as in most cases, ﬁrms must devote some energy and re-
sources to convincing the standard-setter, be it a government agency or an
assembly of producers, that the norm ought to be set at the level they fa-
vor. Like in rent-seeking models, the amount that ﬁrms are willing to spend
on successful lobbying eﬀort is equal to their potential gain. If one believes
that the eventually-adopted standard is a reﬂection of these lobbying eﬀorts,
then monotonicity in maximal proﬁt changes makes for a very defensible
assumption.
Our model also assumes that ﬁrms produce ﬁxed quantities. This is
analytically convenient and facilitates the comparison with Leland, for in
his model ﬁr m st a k et h em a r k e tp r i c ea sg i v e na n dd e c i d ew h e t h e ro rn o t
they want to supply a pre-determined quantity. Sophisticated ﬁrms could
5of course realize that their quantity choice aﬀects the market price. These
strategic eﬀects are quite complicated and we prefer overlooking them in the
present study.2 We think of the situation as one in which bargaining and
production speciﬁcation takes place well before the choice of output level,
or one in which heavy investment in capacities is required previous to any
choice concerning product characteristics.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the basic model. Some preliminaries concerning alternative market
structures and welfare comparisons are developed in Section 3. Section 4
presents the main results. Section 5 presents some extensions of the basic
model. Section 6 concludes and suggests the directions in which the model
could be taken. All the formal proofs are collected in a ﬁnal section.
2M o d e l
Two ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ {L,H},e a c hp r o d u c eaﬁxed quantity αi (set at
half a unit for most of this paper) of a variant of a given good, whose quality
xi ≥ 0 they choose. Firms diﬀer with respect to the cost of production at a
given quality level. Consumers cannot observe the quality of the individual
products and cannot distinguish their origin (i.e. know the identity of their
producer). Instead, consumers’ demand depends upon their expectation or
observation of the prevailing average quality. By assumption, the market
price is set so as to equate demand with the ﬁxed aggregate supply (which
we always take to equal one unit).
We model the situation as a two-player two-stage game.3 In Stage 1, the
two ﬁrms bargain over a common minimal level of quality, denoted m ≥ 0.
In the absence of agreement m =0 , that is, no standard is enforced.4 The
2We have given a try at analyzing a quantity-setting game in the same demand envi-
ronment as this model’s. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
3Because our ﬁrst "stage" involves a cooperative bargaining solution, our model does
not ﬁtt h et e c h n i c a ld e ﬁnition of a "game" in canonical non-cooperative game theory. It
would be possible to cast it into the usual framework by artiﬁcially introducing a third
player called upon choosing the common standard in Stage 1, whose objective function
would involve costly departures from the Kalai-Smorodinsky ratio of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Al-
ternatively, one can see the analysis of ﬁrms’ behavior in Stage 2 as background work for
the determination of the bargaining set and take the situation to be a pure bargaining
problem. We ﬁnd the reference to stages useful and will hence continue using it.
4Any strictly positive but ineﬀective standard (one that would not aﬀect ﬁrms’ behavior
6outcome of the negotiation process is captured by the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution. The KS solution chooses the point on the Pareto fron-
tier of the bargaining set at which the ratio of ﬁrms’ actual gains over the
disagreement outcome equals the ratio of their "ideal" gains, i.e. the gains
they can expect under the most favorable negotiation outcome.
In Stage 2, ﬁrms take the minimum level of quality agreed upon in Stage
1 as given, and simultaneously choose the quality levels, xL and xH.T h e
minimal level of quality, m, is assumed to be strictly and costlessly enforced:
ﬁrms cannot choose a quality level falling short of that standard.
There is a cost associated with increasing quality. We assume that the
cost per unit produced is a quadratic function of quality5 given by θi·(xi)2/2,
where θi ≥ 0 is a parameter standing for ﬁrm i’s cost of quality.T h e r ea r en o
ﬁxed costs. Hence, each ﬁrm’s total production cost is equal to αi·θi·(xi)2/2.
We assume that θH ≥ θL a n di ti su n d e r s t o o dt h a ti nt h ec a s ew h e nt h i s
inequality strictly holds and ﬁrms produce the same quality level, ﬁrm L
enjoys a lower marginal cost than ﬁrm H, justifying our choice of subscripts.
After both ﬁrms have determined their quality levels, consumers observe
(or infer) the average level of quality ¯ x. Their aggregate demand is an aﬃne
function of this average. More precisely, the quantity demanded, at any given
price p, is taken to be
D(p)=1+a +¯ x − p,( 1 )
where a ≥ 0 is a demand-shifting parameter introduced to guarantee full
market coverage. This demand could arise from a continuum of consumers
with valuations of the good in question uniformly distributed between 0 and
1+a +¯ x.6
in Stage 2) could be equivalently chosen as the disagreement point.
5The quadratic speciﬁcation for marginal cost seems to be the most economical spec-
iﬁcation to address the problem at hand. In the case where marginal cost is a linear
function of quality, there is no equilibrium in pure and interior strategies to the quality
"subgame" in general, and this is so independently of the choice of the inverse demand
function. There do exist "corner-solution" equilibria but they are uninteresting as they
give rise to trivial bargaining problems (degeneracy or immediate agreement on a unique
Pareto-eﬃcient outcome).
6For instance, consumers could all be willing to buy one unit of the good only. Their
preferences could be deﬁned over that good and all the other goods they possibly care
about. Absent any strong income eﬀect, their indirect utility function could then be taken
to be linearly separable in the gross utility derived from that unit and its price. The
utility from consuming the good could comprise a "baseline" utility level, diﬀering across
consumers, and a valuation-of-quality term, identical across consumers. For example, a
7The equilibrium market price p∗ is deﬁned by equating demand with the
ﬁxed supply, giving p∗ = a +¯ x. In most of this article, we will consider the
situation where both ﬁrms produce half a unit. Thus, the market price, as a
function of the ﬁrms’ quality levels, is
p
∗ (xL,x H)=a +
1
2
(xL + xH).( 2 )
Firms strive to maximize their proﬁts, Πi =[ p∗ (xL,x H) − (θi · (xi)2)/2]/2.















Before analyzing the model, it is informative to analyze some related market
structures and make some welfare comparisons.
3.1 Monopoly
Consider ﬁrst the monopoly case. Suppose then that there is a single decision-
maker who sets xL and xH so as to maximize πL (xH,x L)+πH (xH,x L),
the total proﬁt to a corporation owning both production plants or "proﬁt
centers." Implicit in the speciﬁcation of this objective function is the as-
sumption that the diﬀerence in costs across plants is not due to a diﬀer-
ence in technologies–potentially eliminated by a merger–but to some other
cause(s), for instance, heterogeneity in the quality or price of local inputs
(such as land in agriculture, metals in the industry, or labor in general).





















+ a.( 5 )
unit mass of consumers indexed by t ∈ [0,1] could have preferences represented by the
utility functions Ut = bt + x − p where each consumer t derives a baseline utility from
consuming one unit of the good equal to a + t and a quality-related utility equal to x.
8The higher the cost parameters, the lower are the qualities, as well as the
monopolist’s proﬁt.
















2 .( 6 )
The unrestricted maximizers of this function happen to be xM
L and xM
H ,
so that a monopoly achieves economic eﬃciency. The same is true if the
decision-maker is restricted to choose only one quality to be produced by
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the harmonic mean of xM
L and xM
H ,j u s ta sW(x,x) is. There is nothing
surprising in these results. We know from Spence (1975) that the source
of the divergence between the socially optimal quality and the one chosen
by a proﬁt-maximizer lies in the diﬀerence between the marginal consumer’s
valuation of quality improvements and the average consumer’s valuation of
quality improvements (where the average is taken over all infra-marginal
consumers). This discrepancy does not materialize when demand is linear in
quality, i.e. when consumers’ marginal valuations of quality are identical, as
here.
3.2 Perfect information: monopolistic competition
Another relevant case for comparison is when there are two ﬁrms but con-
sumers can distinguish the two products. Then, these are sold on two sepa-
rate yet interdependent markets in a monopolistically competitive manner.
If a unit mass of consumers indexed by t is uniformly distributed over
[0,1] and endowed with preferences of the form Ut = a + t + x − p,a n di f
they randomly patron one ﬁrm or the other when they are indiﬀerent, then
the residual demand addressed to ﬁrm L is given by




1 if xL − pL >x H − pH
1/2 if xL − pL = xH − pH
0 if xL − pL <x H − pH
,( 9 )
9and conversely for ﬁrm H.
If ﬁrms simultaneously choose qualities and prices, then under our quan-

















As it is clearly not optimal to price so high as to generate zero demand or
to price so low as to create excess residual demand, ﬁrm i’s best response





















Thus, there are inﬁnitely many equilibria but, as long as the market is fully
covered, they all share the features that the price diﬀerential equals the
quality diﬀerential, and qualities are socially optimal. The resulting proﬁtt o









+ a + c
¸
,( 1 1 )
where c is a function of the prices selected in a particular equilibrium. As
expected, the equilibrium proﬁtt oe a c hﬁrm is decreasing in its own cost
parameter.
3.3 Asymmetric information in the absence of stan-
dard
Now suppose that there are two ﬁrms, that consumers cannot distinguish
the two products, and that there is no quality standard. Formally, this is
equivalent to letting m be exogenously ﬁxed at zero in the model outlined in
Section 2.
First, observe that each ﬁrm’s proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi(xH,x L),d e ﬁn e di ne q u a -
tion (3), is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in xi. Hence, a







.( 1 2 )
10When ﬁrms make their decision, they do not take into account the positive
externality that their eﬀort entails for the other ﬁrm. This explains why
quality is underprovided as compared to the monopoly case or the duopoly
case with perfectly informed consumers.7















for i = L,H and j 6= i.N o t e t h a t ﬁrm H makes a higher proﬁtt h a nﬁrm
L! This reversal of the proﬁt ranking, as compared to the separate markets
case, is a consequence of the free riding occuring in this market. To see this,
let us call the portion of proﬁtt h a taﬁrm can aﬀect through its own choice
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Similarly, let us call the portion of a ﬁrm’s proﬁtt h a tr e s u l t sf r o mt h ei m p a c t






,( 1 5 )
where xj stands for the other ﬁrm’s eﬀort choice. Then πi = ιi + εi + a/2.
It is easily veriﬁed that in equilibrium ﬁrm L’s internal proﬁti sh i g h e r
than ﬁrm H’s internal proﬁt, that is: ι2 >ι 1. On the other hand, ﬁrm L
does not beneﬁtm u c hf r o mﬁrm H’s low quality choice, which contributes
little to the market price, while ﬁrm H quite gains from the high quality
produced by ﬁrm L, which raises the price it receives. Hence, ε1 >ε 2.F o r
the particular speciﬁcation of our payoﬀ function, with equal quantities, this
latter external eﬀect is so big as to dominate. In other terms: ε1−ε2 >ι 2−ι1.
4A n a l y s i s
We now proceed to analyse the model presented in Section 2. We ﬁrst con-
sider Stage 2 (ﬁrms’ production decisions after the standard has been set),
which determines the boundaries of the proﬁt possibility set deﬁning Stage
1’s bargaining problem.
7If the industry were composed of n ﬁrms, each selling a fraction 1/n of total output,




Recall that each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ πi is a strictly concave function of its own
eﬀort, xi. Suppose that a standard m ≥ 0 has been agreed upon in Stage
1, constraining ﬁrms’ quality choices in Stage 2. By strict concavity, the
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By assumption, ﬁrm H faces a higher cost of quality. Thus, ﬁrm H always
chooses a smaller quality level than ﬁrm L. From equations (3) and (16),
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, πi (x∗
H,x ∗
L) can be shown to depend on m, the minimal quality
level agreed upon in Stage 1, in the following manner:
for m< 1














for m ∈ [ 1
2θH, 1




























Several observations are in order. Firstly, when the standard does not
constrain ﬁrms’ choices, then, as explained in the previous section and as a
result of free riding, the high-cost ﬁr mm a k e sm o r ep r o ﬁt than the low-cost
ﬁrm.
Secondly, ﬁrm H loses from a binding quality standard, when set at an
intermediate level: m ∈ ( 1
2θH, 1
2θL]. T h i si sb e c a u s ei nt h i sr a n g e ,ﬁrm L’s
behavior is unaﬀected by the standard, whose sole eﬀect is to force ﬁrm H to
depart from its optimal choice of quality. As a consequence, πH is decreasing
in m in this interval.
Thirdly, once m> 1
2θL, ﬁrm L is forced to raise its quality level as well.
That leads to an increase in ﬁrm H’s revenues through the increase in the
market price but proﬁtability also depends on costs. Observe that, when
the standard is doubly binding, ﬁrm H’s proﬁt function is single-peaked at
m = 1
θH. Thus determining the behavior of πH in ( 1
2θL,+∞) requires us to
know whether 1
θH falls into that interval or not. We have 1
θH > 1
2θL if and only
if ﬁrm H is at a cost disadvantage relatively to ﬁrm L but this disadvantage
is less than twofold. That is:
θL ≤ θH < 2θL.( 1 7 )
12In that case, πH increases with m over [ 1
2θL, 1
θH] and decreases thereafter.
Nonetheless, it is possible for πH never to reach again its initial level. Indeed,
if ﬁrm H is at a big cost disadvantage relatively to ﬁrm L, then its costs will
have become very high when the standard ﬁnally reaches the zone where it
aﬀects ﬁrm L’s behavior. So, even if an increase in the standard increases
ﬁrm L’s proﬁt in that zone, it never brings it back to the level associated to
low eﬀort and no standard. A simple computation shows that there are gains
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Under our assumptions, the ratio θL/θH lies between zero and one and can
be interpreted as a measure of cost homogeneity, a magnitude which will play
an important role in all that follows. Thus, condition (18) requires ﬁrms not
to be too dissimilar in costs in order for ﬁrm H to ﬁnd it proﬁtable to put
an end to free riding.
Fourthly, we observe that ﬁrm L’s proﬁts t a r t si n c r e a s i n ga ss o o na st h e
standard impacts ﬁrm H’s behavior, that is, for all m> 1
2θH.T h e r e i s a
kink at m = 1
2θL, when the standard starts constraining ﬁrm L as well. Yet,
πL continues increasing with m until m = 1
θL,w h i c hi sﬁrm L’s preferred
standard.
The two diagrams below depict the ﬁrms’ proﬁts as functions of m.T h e
thin line stands for ﬁrm H’s proﬁt while the thick line is for ﬁrm L.F i g u r e
1 corresponds to the case where a =0 , θH =1 .45 and θL =1 . (These
parameters meet condition [18] on cost homogeneity.) One can see that ﬁrm
H is hurt by an intermediate-level standard but recovers once m becomes
high enough. There is a range of values for which πH is higher than the
vertical intercept.
Figure 2 corresponds to the case where a =0 , θH =1 .9 and θL =1 .
(These parameters do not meet condition [18] on cost homogeneity.) One can
see that ﬁrm H is hurt by an intermediate-level standard, recovers somewhat
once m becomes high enough but not so as to bring πH back to its initial
level.
8This condition guarantees that the maximum achieved by πH on [ 1
2θL,∞) is strictly
greater than the proﬁta c h i e v e dw h e nm =0 .












Figure 1: The two ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts, as functions of the common
minimum standard, m. Intermediate cost homogeneity.
4.2 Bargaining problem
A bargaining problem is usually deﬁned with respect to a set of possible
utility allocations, the feasible set, and a fallback or disagreement point in





, the proﬁts to the ﬁrms when they do not adopt any standard. The
table displaying ﬁrm’s proﬁts as functions of m in the previous subsection is
a parametric characterization of the set of possible utility allocations in R2.
It is well-known that in the case of the KS solution as in many others’, the
consideration of the set of utility changes from the disagreement allocation
utilities leads to the same solution as the consideration of the original fea-
sible set. So we can take the feasible set to be the set F of gains over the
no-standard-case proﬁts, and the disagreement point to be (0,0). Because
the KS solution satisﬁes individual rationality, one is in fact only interested
in the set of outcomes in which ﬁrms’ gains are positive. A bargaining prob-
lem is said to be degenerate if the feasible set does not contain any point
corresponding to strict gains over the disagreement utilities for all parties












Figure 2: The two ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts, as functions of the common
minimum standard, m. Small cost homogeneity.
(that is, here, if F ∩ R2
++ = ∅).
Because the KS solution is deﬁned by reference to each party’s most
favorable outcome, we would like to know which standards lead to the highest
gains to ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L. At the same time, by individual rationality, only
the outcomes in which both ﬁr m sm a k ea tl e a s ta sm u c hp r o ﬁt than in the
n o - s t a n d a r dc a s er e a l l ym a t t e r .W es a wi nt h ep r e v i o u ss u b s e c t i o nt h a tﬁrm
H is susceptible to make more proﬁt than in the absence of a standard only
if the MQS aﬀects both ﬁrms and if cost homogeneity is large enough. By
comparing ﬁrm H’s proﬁt under such a doubly binding standard to ﬁrm H’s
proﬁt when its quality choice is unrestricted, one can ﬁnd the interval [z1,z 2]
of relevant standards.9 T h e r ei sn oi s s u ea b o u tﬁrm L’s gains being non-
positive in that interval since its revenues are the same as ﬁrm H’s but its
9Formally, this is done by computing the roots of the equation
πU
H = πH [x∗
H(m),x ∗
L(m)].
15costs of production are smaller by assumption. So the best feasible outcome
for ﬁrm H is always m =1 /θH. On the other hand, ﬁrm L’s proﬁti s
maximized at m =1 /θL but that standard may or may not lie within [z1,z 2].
Indeed, if cost homogeneity is not so small as to prevent any agreement but
still consequential, then ﬁrm H makes a loss when m =1 /θL,a st h i sl e v e lo f
quality is simply too costly to produce. In that case (to which we will refer as
the intermediate cost homogeneity case), the best outcome for ﬁrm L under
the constraint that ﬁrm H does not earn less than its disagreement proﬁt
corresponds to m = z2, which is smaller than 1/θL.10 This is the situation
depicted in Figure 1.
Thus, we have to distinguish three cases. Under small cost homogeneity,
ﬁrm H never beneﬁts from agreeing to a binding standard. Under interme-
diate cost homogeneity, ﬁrm’s H favorite standard is 1/θH, while ﬁrm L’s
maximal feasible gain corresponds to z2 < 1/θL. Under large cost homo-
geneity, ﬁrms’ maximal gains correspond to 1/θH and 1/θL, respectively. We
characterize these three cases more precisely in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Firms’ most favorable outcomes under the condition that all par-
ties make at least as much as under disagreement are given by the following
table:






























θH ≤ 1 m = 1
θL m = 1
θH
A proof of the lemma can be found in the appendix.
4.2.1 Small cost homogeneity
If condition (18) on costs is not satisﬁed, i.e. if the ﬁrms display a small
level of cost homogeneity, then ﬁrm H never beneﬁts from agreeing to a
quality standard. Hence, the bargaining problem in Stage 1 is degenerate, as
10A variant of the KS solution, suggested by Kalai and Rosenthal (1978), chooses the
allocation that sets players’ utilities proportional to their most optimistic expectation of
gain, even when this gain entails losses for one or more players, i.e. when the corresponding
allocation is not individually rational. For the problem at hand, it is hard to argue that
such allocations should play a role in the determination of the ﬁnal bargain.
16there are no "gains from trade" to be shared among the bargainers. Strictly
speaking, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is not deﬁned in that instance.11
Intuition nevertheless suggests that ﬁrm H will refuse any standard above
its unconstrained optimum xU
H = 1
2θH and accept any standard less than or
equal to the latter, out of indiﬀerence. The limit case when θL/θH =2 /3
opens the possibility that ﬁrms agree on setting m equal to 1
θH,a st h i si s
proﬁtable to ﬁrm L and makes no diﬀerence to ﬁrm H. We summarize these
considerations in the following paragraph.
Remark 2 In the case of small cost homogeneity (θL/θH ≤ 2/3), the bar-
gaining problem is degenerate: Any ineﬀective standard m ≤ 1/(2θH) might
be chosen. Consequently, ﬁrms’ qualities and proﬁts are the same as in the
absence of a standard. If θL/θH =2 /3, then there might also be an outcome
in which m =1 /θH,i nw h i c hc a s eq u a l i t y ,p r i c e ,a n dﬁrm L’s proﬁta r e
higher than in the absence of a quality standard.
4.2.2 Large cost homogeneity









≤ 1.( 1 9 )
Then, the downward-sloping section of the bargaining set frontier, which






, entirely lies to the northeast
of the disagreement point. It is understood that in case negotiations break
down, no binding standard will be imposed. In that case ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ will
be πU
i ,i t sguaranteed, or disagreement, proﬁt.F i r mi’s actual gain following
the imposition of a binding standard m is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
ﬁrm i’s actual payoﬀ and its guaranteed proﬁt. Firm i’s maximal gain is
deﬁned as the highest achievable proﬁt increment under the condition that
p l a y e r sg e ta tl e a s ta sm u c ha st h e i rg u a r a n t e e dp r o ﬁt.
One can picture the situation in the proﬁts p a c eπH × πL.F i g u r e 3
corresponds to θH =1 .1, θL =1 , a =0
The point (0,0) corresponds to the cases when m ∈ [0, 1
2·1.1], i.e. the
circumstances in which the quality standard is not binding. The beginning
11Neither are other bargaining solutions. Thus, there is a sense in which too big a
diﬀerence in costs prevents agreement on a MQS, independently of the details, or features,
of the bargaining process.










Figure 3: The feasible set and the KS solution when costs are very similar
of the line (before the kink) is for standards m ∈ [ 1
2·1.1, 1
2]. Recall that in this
range, because quality is costly but the norm does not aﬀect ﬁrm L’s be-
havior, ﬁrm H’s proﬁt decreases quadratically while ﬁrm L’s proﬁti n c r e a s e s
linearly. Thus, ﬁrm H’s gain is negative, while ﬁrm L’s is positive. The part
of the line that follows the kink is for higher standards. Its intersections with
the vertical axis correspond to m = z1 and m = z2. The maximal gain for
ﬁrm H is achieved at m = 1
1.1 (vertical dashed line). The maximal gain for
ﬁrm L is achieved at m = 1
1 (horizontal dashed line). The KS solution for
this bargaining problem is found at the intersection of the proﬁt frontier with
the upward-sloping dashed line. At the solution one must have that the ratio
of ﬁrms’ actual gains equals the ratio of ﬁrms’ maximal gains.
It happens that a reasonably simple closed-form solution for the agreed-
upon standard ˆ m is available in that case.















A proof of this claim can be found in the appendix.
Note that when θH = θL = θ, the agreed-upon standard ˆ m equals 1/θ.I n -
deed, when the two ﬁrms are exactly identical, the downward-sloping section
of the bargaining set collapses to a single point, corresponding to 1/θ,a n d
the feasible set reduces to a segment along the 45-degree line. The set [z1,z 2]
still stands for the range of mutually proﬁtable standards but the interests
of the ﬁrms are aligned in the sense that, to the left of 1/θ,b o t hp r e f e rt o
increase the standard and, conversely, to the right of 1/θ,b o t hp r e f e rt od e -
crease it. Since there exists a unique Pareto-optimal outcome, it is attained
by any bargaining solution satisfying Pareto-optimality, in particular by the
KS solution.
The comparative statics of the equilibrium standard are as follows.





θH ≤ 1,t h e n( i )f o ra n yﬁxed θL, ˆ m is strictly
decreasing in θH; (ii) for any ﬁxed θL, ˆ m is strictly decreasing in θH.
A proof of this claim can be found in the appendix.
These small variation eﬀects might look intuitive but they do not neces-
sarily follow from casual observation because in the space of proﬁts, a change
in one cost parameter displaces the frontier of the bargaining set as well as
the disagreement point.12
In equilibrium, ﬁrm L makes a higher proﬁtt h a nﬁrm H,w h i c hi sa
reversal of the ranking under disagreement. This outcome is to be expected
12For instance, if θH goes up, then ﬁrm H’s maximal gain goes down. Indeed, at its
preferred eﬀort standard, 1/θH,i t sp a y o ﬀ decreases to a big extent, as both ﬁrms reduce
the quality provided to the market. In addition, its guaranteed proﬁti sa l s oa ﬀected by
t h ei n c r e a s ei nθH but to a lesser extent as ﬁrm L’s quality remains unchanged. At the
same time, ﬁrm L’s maximal gain goes up because there is no change to its payoﬀ under its
preferred standard, 1/θL, and its guaranteed proﬁtg o e sd o w na sar e s u l to ft h ed e c r e a s e
in external proﬁt .T h eK Ss o l u t i o nt h u sd i c t a t e sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h er a t i oo fﬁrm L’s actual
gain to ﬁrm H’s actual gain. Precisely, at any given binding standard, ﬁrm L’s actual
gain is mechanically increased through the decrease in its guaranteed proﬁt. So, a priori,
it is not clear that the required decrease in the ratio will necessitate a decrease in the
equilibrium standard. Our result shows that it does.
19once both ﬁr m sp r o d u c et h es a m eq u a l i t y ,s i n c et h e yh a v et h es a m er e v e n u e s
but by assumption ﬁrm L has smaller costs.
A straightforward computation allows us to make the following claim.





θH < 1,t h e nˆ m<x M.
That it, the standard that ﬁrms agree upon is lower than the (second-
most) proﬁt-maximizing level, which we know from Section 2 is also the
(second-most) eﬃcient level. This is a consequence of the non-transferable
nature of proﬁt in our model. Joint-proﬁt maximization would require ﬁrm
H to produce at a higher quality level but this would lead to an even greater
enhancement of ﬁrm L’s relative proﬁtability that is precluded by the bar-
gaining solution. If ﬁrm L could somehow share its proﬁtw i t hﬁrm H,i t
w o u l db ep o s s i b l et oa c h i e v ee ﬃciency.
In other terms, the initial free riding that plagues the industry in the
absence of a standard, by allowing ﬁrm H to be (relatively) very proﬁtable,
empowers it too much. Indeed, since the geometric mean of two real numbers
is smaller than their arithmetic means, it is clear that ˆ m lies to the left of the
midpoint between 1/θH and 1/θL. So, to the extent that the agreed-upon
standard is closer to ﬁrm H ’s favorite standard than to ﬁrm L’s, the former
c a nb es a i dt oh a v em o r eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e rt h a nt h el a t t e r . T ot h ee x t e n t
that the agreed-upon standard falls short of the social optimum, it can be
said to have too much of it.
This remark obviously does not apply to the case where θH = θL = θ,
in which case ﬁrms, equal in all respects, agree to implement the ﬁrst-best
standard 1/θ.
4.2.3 Intermediate cost homogeneity






5.T h e n ﬁrm L’s maximum feasible gain
is no longer achieved at m = 1








θH as ﬁrm H
would refuse any standard delivering less than its disagreement proﬁt. One
can picture the situation in the proﬁts p a c eπH × πL. Figure 4 corresponds
to θH =1 .4, θL =1 , a =0 .
It is easily seen that ﬁrm L’s maximal gain corresponds to so high a
standard that ﬁrm H would make less than its guaranteed proﬁt. Thus, the
best that ﬁrm L can reasonably expect is the standard corresponding to the










Figure 4: The feasible set and the KS solution when costs are somewhat
similar
intersection of F with the vertical axis, which is z2. Again, at the solution
o n em u s th a v et h a tt h er a t i oo fﬁrms’ actual gains equals the ratio of ﬁrms’
maximal gains, which translates into a quadratic equation whose bigger root,
˜ m, is the solution to our bargaining problem.
It is possible to get a closed-form expression for this root but it is not
appealing, its derivatives being too complicated to be easily signed. Com-
parative statics can nevertheless be studied by recalling that the deﬁning







where A is ﬁrm L’s actual gain, B Firm H’s actual gain, C Firm L’s maximal
gain, and D ﬁrm H’s maximal gain. Because of the single-peakedness of the
polynomial m − 1






.S oo n e
can start from a situation where the equality prevails, introduce a "small"
change to either θH or θL, and look at the resulting change in C/D.I fA/B,
21evaluated at the initial solution (but at the new θH or θL), has not changed
to the same extent, then it must be that ˜ m has changed in order to bring the
two ratios back into equality. This way we are able to make the following
claim.






5,t h e nf o rag i v e nθL, ˜ m is strictly decreas-
ing in θH.
A proof of this claim can be found in the appendix.
By contrast, the changes in ˜ m brought about by small changes in θL
do not always go in the same direction. It is possible to show that if the
homogeneity in costs between ﬁrms is quite low, then an increase in θL leads
to an increase in the agreed-upon standard.
Proposition 7 There exists c ≤ 4
3+
√







, then for any
given θH, ˜ m is strictly increasing in θL.




θH is very close to 2
3, there is a very small interval of standards
( 1
θH,z 2) to the right of 1
θH that ﬁrm H could agree upon as generating more
than the disagreement level of proﬁt. Because we are so close to 1
θH,w e
a r ev e r ym u c ha tt h et o po fﬁrm H’s proﬁt hill under a doubly-binding
standard (when one pictures πH as a function of m). Any increase in θL,
by decreasing ﬁrm H’s guaranteed proﬁt, has the eﬀect of pushing z2 to
the right along a nearly horizontal trajectory. Thus, there is an enormous
change in z2, that increases ﬁrm L’s maximal gain at an extraordinary rate.
As the KS bargaining solution is monotonic in maximal utility gains over
the disagreement utility, that translates into a big increase in ﬁrm L’s actual
gain, which is achievable only through a rise in the eﬀort standard. The
key point is that ﬁrm L’s proﬁt under its favorite standard of all, 1
θL,d o e s
not change much following the rise in θL but that does not matter as this
outcome is so unfavorable to ﬁrm H that it cannot be agreed-upon anyway.
By contrast, among the outcomes that ﬁrm H can rationally accept, ﬁrm L’s
maximal gain changes tremendously because ﬁrm H is suddenly open to a
much larger range of standards. Thus, the enhanced similarity between the
ﬁr m so p e n su pt h er a n g eo fm u t u a l l yb e n e ﬁcial bargains in a way that is
biased towards ﬁrm L.




so is the derivative of ˜ m. That implies that the derivative of ﬁrm L’s proﬁt
function is also inﬁnitely positive at that point. In other terms, when ﬁrm
L’s cost increases in a way that makes ﬁrm H suddenly willing to agree
to a much broader range of standards, then ﬁrm L’s proﬁtg o e su p : It is
proﬁt a b l et ob e c o m el e s se ﬃcient if it is the price to pay to become more
similar. Again, this is so because the change in θL has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
ﬁrm L’s maximum gain.
This behavior of the agreed-upon standard when cost homogeneity is
verging to smallness might raise doubt about the appropriateness of our
bargaining solution: Might ﬁrm L not be tempted by masquerading as a
slightly more ineﬃcient ﬁrm, when information about costs is not perfect, in
order to get a MQS closer to its favorite one? For instance, if the standard-
setter is a public authority, might ﬁrm L not lie about its cost in order to fool
the arbitrator? This questions are out of the scope of this paper. We note
that Moulin (1984) proved that the KS solution was implementable as the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a mechanism in which players
are asked to bid "fractions of dictatorship."13
It is readily observed that, were we to compute the level of the standard
that equated ﬁrms’ actual gains ratio to ﬁrms’ ideal gains ratio, disregarding
individual rationality considerations, the algebraic expression would be given
by ˆ m in Proposition 3, and we would have ˆ m>˜ m.( T h ed o t t e dr a yw o u l d
rotate counterclockwise in Figure 4.) From Remark 5 we know that ˆ m is
smaller than the (second-most) eﬃcient standard. As a result, we can draw
a similar conclusion for ˜ m.






5,w eh a v e˜ m<ˆ m<
xM.
This implies that the adopted standard lies even closer to ﬁrm H’s favorite
choice than ﬁrm L’s.
13Because of its scale invariance and symmetry properties, the KS solution in eﬀect max-
imizes a Rawlsian social welfare function once the problem is suitably normalized. Thus,
implementability is not surprising. For two-person problems, Kalai and Rosenthal (1978)
had already oﬀered a mechanism Nash-implementing the KS solution (among other equi-
libria). Myiagawa (2002) proposes a general game form that implements the KS solution
(along with the Nash solution and some weighted utilitarian solutions) in subgame-perfect
equilibrium.





Firm L's cost parameter
adopted standard
Firm L's cost parameter
adopted standard
Figure 5: The relationship between the adopted standard and Firm 2’s cost
parameter in the case when c1 =1 .5.
4.3 Numerical example









for θL. Figure 5 depicts how the adopted standard behaves when ﬁrm L’s cost
parameter varies from 1 to 1.5, the range for which the bargaining problem is
not degenerate. Values below the treshold (to the left of the dashed vertical
line on the graph) correspond the case of intermediate cost heterogeneity;
values above the treshold (to the right of the dashed line) correspond to the
case of small cost heterogeneity.
When ﬁrm L is very eﬃcient (θL close to 1), the adopted standard is very
c l o s et ot h eo n ef a v o r e db yﬁrm H, 2
3, which in the limit is the only one that
the latter can agree to. As ﬁrm L’s cost increases, the agreed-upon standard
goes up ﬁrst, peaks a bit before the treshold before decreasing toward 2
3,t h e
norm that both ﬁrms happen to favor as θL converges to 1.5.
The graph makes clear that the derivative of the equilibrium standard
right of 1 is inﬁnitely positive, a fact used in the proof of Proposition 8, and
implying that ﬁrm L’s proﬁt, as a function of θL, is increasing in that region.
24A possible measure of ﬁrms’ bargaining power is the distance between
the adopted standard and their favorite standard. One could in principle
construct an index of Firm L’s bargaining power by expressing the distance





. The higher this index, the closer to Firm L’s ideal point the
adopted standard is. The remarks made above imply that this index is
bounded above by 0.5. Indeed, in the numerical example it increases mono-
tonically toward this value as θL goes up. This is again an indication that
similarity is desirable in this context.
5 Extensions
5.1 Uncertainty in production
The basic model can be straightforwardly extended to deal with uncertainty
in the production process making qualities random variables. Under risk-
neutrality on the part of producers and consumers, it is suﬃcient to reinter-
pret the variable xi as "eﬀort" determining the mean of the product quality
distribution and all the results carry over without modiﬁcation.
5.2 Risk-aversion
The model described in Section 2 assumed that demand linearly depended
upon the average quality, implying that the valuation of the good was in-
dependent of the other features of the lottery over qualities that consumers
faced when purchasing the good. One might argue that consumers’ willing-
ness to pay should decrease with the uncertainty associated to the sampling
procedure, as a consequence of risk-aversion. If consumers’ willingness to
pay is taken to correspond to the lottery’s certainty equivalent, then all the
qualitative features of our model are preserved.
For instance, one can assume that a unit mass of consumers indexed by t is
uniformly distributed on [0,1].C o n s u m e rt’s preferences can be represented
by the following utility function:
Ut = bt +
√
x − p,( 2 1 )
where baseline utility, bt,e q u a l sa + t. With this structure, the demand
associated to a fair lottery between qualities xL and xH, whose arithmetic






xLxH − p.( 2 2 )




















.( 2 3 )
This expression is strictly concave in xi. Because consumers are willing to
pay less when they face a large quality diﬀerential, there is now an additional
incentive for ﬁr m st oc h o o s eq u a l i t i e st h a ta r ec l o s et oe a c ho t h e r .A sar e s u l t ,
the optimal choice of quality is no longer independent of the other ﬁrm’s
decision. Nevertheless, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of




















It is easily veriﬁed that ﬁrm H’s (ﬁrm L’s) quality is higher (lower) than
under risk neutrality. Firm H produces only a fraction of the quality chosen
by ﬁrm L. A monopolist owning both plants would keep the ratio of xH to













L,( 2 5 )
showing that free riding is as momentous under risk-aversion as under risk-
neutrality. Because the marginal valuation of quality improvements is still
the same across consumers, the monopolist’s choices would be mimicked by
14Under monotonic preferences represented by the Bernoulli utility function U,t h e
certainty equivalent (CEL) associated to a fair lottery L between xL and xH is deﬁned by
U(CEL)=1
2U(xL)+1
2U(xH) ≡ EU(L).I fU(x)=
√





same preferences can be represented by the utility function V (L)=CEL since for two
lotteries L1 and L2, L1 % L2 iﬀ EU(L1) ≥ EU(L2), which by deﬁnition is equivalent to
U(CE1) ≥ U(CE2), which by monotonicity is equivalent to CE1 ≥ CE2,t h u sj u s t i f y i n g
our assumption that demand is linear in the certainty equivalent.
26a social planner seeking to maximize total surplus. Hence, so far all the
qualitative features of the model are preserved.
Observe now that once the MQS is doubly binding, i.e. when xL = xH =
m, the proﬁt function reduces to the one studied in Section 4! So there is no
change to the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set and no change either to the
second-most eﬃcient MQS. The disagreement point only is aﬀected by the
introduction of risk-aversion, moving northwestwardly as a smaller quality
diﬀerential makes for less initial free riding. Consequently, the agreed-upon
standard is higher than under risk-neutrality as ﬁrm H’s bargaining position
is weakened. In turn, that implies that the adopted standard is closer to the
second-best standard than under risk-neutrality.
One should be careful with the interpretation of this model. The infor-
mation structure is such that consumers are in all circumstances aware of
the characteristics of the lottery they face. That is, they know the individual
product qualities but are unable physically to distinguish the two products
at the time of purchase. The absence of labelling or branding is key here.15
5.3 Unequal market shares
Recall that αH was taken to be ﬁrm H’s market share. Since we maintain
the assumption that aggregate supply equals one, it is also ﬁrm H’s ﬁxed
quantity. For simplicity we will denote it by α and let 1 − α stand for ﬁrm
L’s quantity. When considering this situation, it is again essential to be very
clear about the information structure characterizing the demand side of the
model: here, as in the original "lemons" example, the probability to draw a
variant of a given quality equals the market share of that variant.
In Stage 2, since consumers care about the weighted average of qualities,
ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by
πi (xL,x H)=αi
∙






.( 2 6 )











,( 2 7 )
15The entire analysis could be conducted by assuming that Ut = a + t + x
1
k − p for
k>1. The parameter k, because it governs the curvature of the function U,i sam e a s u r e








, a familiar CES form.
27as would a benevolent social planner. If they had to specify quality uniformly,




αθH +( 1− α)θL
,( 2 8 )
the weighted harmonic mean of xM
H and xM
L .











,( 2 9 )
which is a direct generalization of the results in Section 4. Intuitively, the
downward quality distortion is caused by the positive externality associated
with a quality improvement. Since this externality is proportional to market
share, so is the quality distortion: the smaller ﬁrm H’s market share, the





























L for any α ∈ [d,1]. That is, provided it is not minuscule, ﬁrm H
makes more proﬁtt h a nﬁrm L in the absence of an eﬀective standard.
Since bargaining really takes place over margins (by scale invariance of
the KS solution), it is more interesting to look at the conditions under which
ﬁrm H’s margin, denoted by ξH,i sg r e a t e rt h a nﬁrm L’s, denoted by ξL.
Observe that











,( 3 1 )
which is strictly increasing in α. It is a matter of computation to show that






,( 3 2 )
the last quantity always being greater than 1/2.
We have to distinguish two cases here. If α is small, then xU
H ≤ xU
L;
that is, ﬁrm H free-rides on ﬁrm L.I f α is large enough, then we are in
28t h es o m e w h a tp e r v e r s ec a s ew h e r et h el o w - c o s tﬁrm enjoys so low a market
share that it chooses to free-ride on the high-cost ﬁrm. Our results can be
straighforwardly generalized in the ﬁrst case.










.( 3 3 )
Observe that this treshold, which is always equal to, or greater than, 1/2,i s







We get a table of proﬁts as functions of the MQS very similar to the one
in the equal market shares’ case (omitting the a-terms):
for m< α

















for m ∈ [ α
θH, 1−α























Observe again that once the standard is binding for both ﬁrms (for m>
(1 − α)/θL) ,t h eu n i tm a r g i n sa r ee x a c t l yt h es a m ea si nt h ee q u a lm a r k e t
shares’ case. Thus, there is no change to the Pareto frontier of the bargaining
set; only the disagreement point is aﬀected by the quantity asymmetry. In
particular, for α ≤ 1/2, there is initially more free riding and that enhances
ﬁrm H’s bargaining position, leading to the adoption of a standard that is
lower than in the case of equal market shares. Any decrease in α causes the
disagreement point to move southeastwardly, leading to a decrease in the
adopted standard (if anything).
It is possible to generalize the results concerning the role of cost ho-
mogeneity in the determination of the bargaining outcome. Firm H never
beneﬁts from a standard that aﬀects its behavior only. It can beneﬁtf r o m
a doubly binding standard only if θL/θH is greater than [2(1 − α)]/[1 + α],
which provides an upper bound for the "small homogeneity" region. In that
case 1/θH remains its favorite outcome. This condition cannot be satisﬁed
if α<1/3.16 Thus, if the market share enjoyed by the high-cost ﬁrm is
too small, free riding is intense and there is no hope of getting the problem
solved through a standard-setting procedure that puts any weight on ﬁrm
H’s proﬁt, whatever the level of cost homogeneity. Moreoever, the bound
is decreasing in α. Taken together, these observations justify the following
remark.
16Indeed, in that case [2(1 − α)]/[1 + α] > 1.
29Remark 9 In the region where the high-cost ﬁrm initially free-rides on the
low-cost ﬁrm’s eﬀort, the smaller ﬁrm H’s market share, the greater the
extent of free riding, and the larger the level of cost homogeneity required for
the bargaining problem to be non-degenerate.
That is, for ﬁrms to agree on some eﬀective standard, it is imperative
that they not be too dissimilar in all respects. If their size diﬀerence is big,
then the cost diﬀerential must be small in order for them to ﬁnd a common
ground.
Provided cost heterogeneity is not too large, ﬁrm H is willing to agree to









.( 3 4 )
Firm L’s most optimistic expectation of proﬁt corresponds to its favorite






α2 − 4α +3
i
,( 3 5 )
the former is larger.
Therefore, we still have the three regions identiﬁed in Section 4 and the
results carry over.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have studied a simple model in which consumers cannot observe the
quality (or quality eﬀort) choices made by two producers but demand depends
instead upon the average quality of the goods available in the market. Before
specifying the quality aspect of their products, the two ﬁrms engage into
bargaining over the adoption of a strictly and costlessly enforced minimum
quality (eﬀort) standard. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is assumed to
capture the outcome of this negotiation.
In the absence of a standard, ﬁrms underprovide quality as a result of a
classical public good problem. We have shown that if ﬁrms have very diﬀerent
costs for quality, then they cannot agree on any common standard, except
perhaps a completely ineﬀective one. When ﬁrms are not too dissimilar,
30then the KS solution selects a standard that is always lower than the joint-
proﬁt maximizing, or for that matter the (second-most) eﬃcient, level. The
adopted standard always lies closer to the high-cost producer’s favorite choice
than to the low-cost producer’s. Thus, there is a tendency for a duopoly
deciding about the minimal level of quality to be provided in a particular
industry to set it too low. This somewhat contrasts with Leland (1979)’s
ﬁnding but it needs to be noted that by prohibiting side transfers and ﬁxing
quantities, we have in eﬀect remove any possibility for the industry to use
t h es t a n d a r ds oa st or e s t r i c to u t p u t .
In our model, the adopted standard often decreases in the cost of pro-
viding quality of any ﬁrm. Nonetheless, when ﬁrms’ costs are such that the
high-cost producer can agree only to a small range of possible norms, the
equilibrium standard increases with the low-cost producer’s cost as the sud-
den expansion of the interval of norms to which the ineﬃcient producer is
amenable enhances the low-cost producer’s bargaining position.
The question of the robustness and generality of these results immedi-
ately arises. One may want to get rid of the ﬁxed-quantity assumption but
the introduction of a quantity choice considerably complicates the analysis.
The extension to larger oligopolies seems more promising. The study of such
a "grand bargaining" could be the ﬁrst step in the study of a more general
partition-game, or club-formation, model in which ﬁrms "decide" which pro-
ducers to join to create a "label" or "brand". Of course, such a model will
necessitate a speciﬁcation of the demand-side less rudimentary than the one
in this article and awaits future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Intermediate homogeneity case

































































P r o o fo fL e m m a1Let γ : R+ → R2 be the function that to each m ≥ 0
associates the proﬁt gain vector:


















Then by deﬁnition the feasible set, F, of gains is the range of γ.17 Since
the intersection of F with R2
+ is what really matters, one looks for the best
outcome for ﬁrms in the positive orthant only.
It was argued in Section 4.1 that if condition (18) was not satisﬁed, then
ﬁrm H’s proﬁt could never be greater than when the standard was not bind-
ing. That is: if
θL
θH < 2
3,t h e nγH(m) <γ H(0) for all m> 1
2θH.T h a tt a k e s
care of the small homogeneity case.

















































Since condition (18) is satisﬁed, γH(m) reaches its maximum at m = 1
θH.
Since θL ≤ θH and 1
θH > 1
2θL, we necessarily have γL( 1
θH) ≥ γH( 1
θH) > 0 and
so γ( 1
θH) ∈ R2







.( 3 8 )
From the analysis in Section 4.1, we know that the unrestricted maximizer
of γL is 1
θL. The range of standards γ−1(R2
+) is {m | γH(m) ≥ 0},a sγL(m) ≥
17As a matter of fact, the KS solution is usually deﬁn e do nc o n v e xf e a s i b l es e t s .T e c h -
nically speaking, we take F to be the convex and comprehensive hull of the range of γ.
See Thomson (1994) for an exact deﬁnition. Convexity is obtained by assuming that the
negotiators can always randomize between outcomes. Comprehensiveness corresponds to
a "free-disposal-of-proﬁt assumption" that is innocuous in our context.
32γH(m) for m ≥ 1
2θH and πU
L as well as πU
H are positive. It is found by























=0 ,( 3 9 )
which equates ﬁrm H’s proﬁt from the imposition of a binding standard18


























.( 4 1 )
and19 γ−1(R2
+)=( z1,z 2).I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t z1 < 1
θH. The question of the
comparison between z2 and 1





















z = z,( 4 3 )
where z =
θH


















.( 4 4 )
18That is: binding for both ﬁrms. We saw that Firm 1’s proﬁt is less than its guaranteed
proﬁt under no standard if the standard does not aﬀect Firm 2’s behavior.
19The range of standards for which there are mutual gains and the interests of the two













corresponds to an upward-sloping
section of the feasible set frontier as both ﬁrms’ proﬁts are going up with m. Similarly, the
interval [ 1
θL,+∞) also corresponds to an upward-sloping section of the proﬁt possibility
set as both ﬁrms’ proﬁts are going down with m.O v e r t h e s e t w o l a t t e r i n t e r v a l s , t h e





















.( 4 5 )
End of proof.








































































































The discriminant of this equation is




,( 4 9 )


















, as the dashed line standing for the ratio of maximal proﬁt
increments on Figure 3 always crosses the upward-sloping section of the fea-




















(θHθL)2 (θH − θL),( 5 2 )
which is positive for any values of θH and θL since by assumption θH >
θL.T h u s , w h e n θH goes up, the numerator in ˆ m goes down. Since the



















3(θH + θL)2 .( 5 3 )
To know the sign of this derivative, it is suﬃcient to study the numerator. If
we can show that











,( 5 4 )





.( 5 5 )
Observe that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in θH. By assumption






(θH)4 .( 5 6 )
The right-hand side of this inequality is of course smaller than 25
3 . Hence,
∂ ˆ m
∂θL < 0 for any θH.
End of proof.








2, Equation (36) holds for a certain ˜ m,t a k e nt ob eﬁxed in
what follows.
Suppose that θH increases inﬁnitesimally. D will go down as it is a positive
linear function of 1
θH. B will decrease by still a bigger percentage for initially,
Firm 1’s actual proﬁt increment is less than its maximum proﬁti n c r e m e n t ,
and the change in Firm 1’s cost brought about by the increase in θH is
proportional to the prevailing eﬀort level, ˜ m, which is bigger than 1
θH.
A will go up following the decrease in Firm 2’s guaranteed proﬁt. (With
higher cost, Firm 1 free-rides even more in the absence of a standard.) With-
out careful calculations, it is not possible to tell whether C will increase
or decrease. On one hand, Firm 2’s guaranteed proﬁtg o e su pb u to nt h e
other hand, its maximal proﬁt z2 − 1
2θL(z2)2 goes down, as ∂z2/∂θH is nega-
tive. Yet, from this extra-impact on Firm 2’s maximal proﬁt( a n df r o mt h e
fact that initially Firm 2’s actual proﬁt increment is less than its maximum
proﬁt increment), it is clear that in any case C grows by a strictly smaller
percentage than A.
Thus, for a ﬁxed ˜ m,w eh a v et h a tA/B grows by a strictly greater per-
centage than C/D. Therefore, ˜ m must have decreased in order to preserve
Equation (36).
End of proof.








2, Equation (36) holds for a certain ˜ m,t a k e nt ob eﬁxed in
what follows.
Suppose that θL increases inﬁnitesimally. Firm 1’s maximal proﬁti n c r e -
ment, D,g o e su pa si t sg u a r a n t e e dp r o ﬁtg o e sd o w na n di t sm a x i m a lp r o ﬁt
remains unchanged. Firm 1’s actual proﬁti n c r e m e n t ,B,g o e su pb yah i g h e r
percentage as the change in guaranteed proﬁt is the same but applies to a














and ˜ m is of course greater than 1
2θL. So the left-hand side of Equation (36),
A/B,g o e sd o w n .
If it can be shown that the right-hand side goes up, then there will be no



































By continuity, dC/dθL is very large in the neighborhood of 2
3θH.T h u s ,
C/D goes up in this neighborhood, provided it is suﬃciently small. As a
result, ˜ m needs to increase in order for Equation (36) to be veriﬁed again.
End of proof.
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